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DISSENTING OPINIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION
EDWARD DUMBAULD "
To the Anglo-American lawyer, dissenting opinions are a familiar
feature of the judicial process. Indeed, they may constitute one of its
glories. The dissenting opinions of Mr. justice Holmes,- are rightly
reckoned among the treasures of our legal literature. Similarly, the
separate opinion of Judge Anzilotti in the Austro-German customs
union case before the Permanent Court of International justice is
described by Professor Brierly as "a contribution of pernanent value
to international jurisprudence". 2 To many Continental European
jurists, on the other hand, dissenting opinions are regarded as
anomalous, if not anathema.3 How is this divergence of attitude to
be explained? What, accordingly, is the status of dissenting opinions
in international law, where due weight must be given to all legal
systems prevailing in the civilized world? 4
I
Every legal system has its procedural law, that is to say, law about
law enforcement. Since in most modern communities the administra-
tion of justice is confided to impartial agencies acting under public
authority, the chief subdivisions of such law deal with the organiza-
tion, and with the operation, of judicial tribunals, respectively.5 The
admissibility of dissenting opinions is a topic falling within the second
I A. B., 1926, Princeton University; LL. B., 1929, LL. M., 1930, Harvard Univer-
sity; Dr. Jr., 1932, University of Leyden; member of Pa. and U. S. Sup. Ct. Bars;
author, Ir.,I3 MAsrsiy OF PROECeIn In IebeRoATIO.AL COSTROVERSlES (1932) ;
Monopolies and the Courts (with Robert H. Jackson) (138) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 23 ;
Neutrality Laws of the United States (1937) 31 AM. J 38) 6 . 306; PlAce of Phloso-
phy iN lnterational Law (1935) 83 U. OF PA. . REV. 590; and other articles in various
legal periodicals.
1. DssalSNTn' OPINIONS OF M. JUSTICE HOLMES (Comp. Lief, 1929).
2. (1932) 3 Zr. F. Aus. O M. RT. U V Cr. 71  For praise of Judge Anzilotti's qualifi-
cations as a jurist by American authorities, see HuDsoNr, Tr E PEMd ANe T Cotm OF
INTERNATIONAL J USTIcs AND TuE QESorti OF AEiCAN PATRcIATION (1925) 8;
Hughes, The World Court a a Going Concer (193o ) 6 AM. B. A. J. I 5I , 154. Judge
Anzilotti had been Secretary General of the Commission of Jurists which drafted the
Statute of the Court, and was one of the first judges elected. He has been excep-
tionally diligent in his attendance at sessions of the Court, having been present at every
session down to 1937, when his record of perfect attendance was broken on account of
illness in his family. [For this information I am indebted to Professor Manley o. Hud-
son; see his table showing attendance of judges in 25 AM. J. INT. LAW (1931) 43.]
From 1928 to 1930 he was President of the Court. But in view of the high level of
ability manifested by the judges of the Court, it would doubtless be too fanciful to
imagine Judge Anzilotti as occupying a position of pre-eminence analogous to that of
Mr. ustice Holmes.
3. Hudson, Ten Years of the World Court (1932) 11 FOR. Arr. 81, go.
4. Cf. articles 9 and 36 (3) of the Court Statute.
4. DUAUw, INTERIM MEAsURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVER-
SS (Nijhoff, I932) 8-9.
(929)
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category, which embraces matters relating to the mode in which
tribunals function when exercising their jurisdiction.6
But rules of "procedure" in this narrow sense are intimately con-
nected with those governing the organization of the judiciary,7 and
both types of procedural law are shaped by and dependent upon the
basic provisions of public law with respect to the function of the
judicial power." What task does the "constitutional" or fundamental
law of a given community assign to its judicial institutions? 9 In par-
ticular, does it acknowledge them as an agency for the elaboration of
substantive law? 10
In this connection it is impossible to ignore differences manifest
in the positive law of different periods and places. One cannot declare
roundly that the function of litigation is simply to apply to individual
situations a foreordained, or pre-existing, substantive law. Such an
assertion would imply that one particular content of procedural law
must be inevitable, (a fallacious assumption akin to that made with
respect to substantive law by "natural law" adherents).
Indeed, such a conception of the judicial function was unknown
before the Reception of Roman Law," which introduced the idea of
law as a general rule laid down by the lawgiver in advance, as a com-
plete and closed system. Until that notion gained acceptance, there
was no law except that which was generated in and for the concrete
case submitted for adjudication. 12  The middle ages had no general
law. 13  It is also notorious that primitive law did not endeavor to
enforce a particular system of rules, but rather strove to appease
litigants in order to deter them from undertaking violent acts of private
revenge.14
6. On the distinction between procedural law in general and rules of procedure in
the narrow sense, see DUmBAULD, op. cit. sUpra note 5, at 13, 18; CHIOVENDA, PRIX-
ci'n DI DnlTTo PRocEsSUALE (1928) IOI. Gordon, Ttw Observance of Law as a Con-
dition of Jurisdiction (1931) 47 L. Q. REv. 386, 389, treats the distinction between lack
of jurisdiction and error in proceeding.
7. Thus a judiciary inadequately staffed to cope with the large mass of business
brought before it will tend to dispose of cases in summary fashion. Cf. Yntema and
Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdictiot (193) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv.
869, 887.
8. ScHULTZE, PBIVATRECHaT UND PROCESS IN IERER WECHsELMEZIEHUNG (1883)
xvi, refers to the public law function of adjudication ("Staatsrechtliche Funktion der
Gerichtsbarkeit").
9. As to "constitutional" rules of international law, see the authorities cited in
DUmBAUILD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 18o, n. I, especially VmDRoss, DIE VERFASSUNG DER
V6LKERRECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT (1926). Cf. also FEIcHE-FELD, PuBuc DEBTS AND
STATE SuccEssIoN (1931) 6oi.
io. ScHiLwzE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 21.
ii. Id. at 214.
12. Id. at lO5, 119.
13. Id. at 218.
14. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF T'E'CommON LAw (1921) 85; CORTESIA DI SERGO, IL
PR0CESSO SENZA Lim (I93o) 1O-II; CHIOVENDA, op. Cit. supra note 6, at I, 741. Hence
the mode of trial was mechanical, a "solemn experiment" designed to evoke the judg-
ment of God rather than convince the court.
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Even today there are differences of opinion as to the true function
of adjudication. While some insist that it is the just solution of dis-
putes,1-5 the prevailing view regards it as enforcement of law,
(attuazione del diritto, Rechtsverwirklichung), the establishment in
concreto of a factual situation corresponding to the relationships
ordained by law.'0
Recent writers have stressed the importance of 'recognizing that
judicial institutions are independent legal phenomena, and not mere
agencies for the mechanical application of substantive law.17 More
important than the formulation of a corpus juris is the establishment
of a judge.' 8 It is more significant socially and politically that the law
prescribe that disputes must be settled by judicial procedure than that
it indicate in advance the precise terms of settlement.' 9 Judicial power
is not confined within the bounds of rules.20
Two factors have tended to obscure recognition by Continental
authorities of what has been said above: the bureaucratic structure of
15. 2 CARNELuTTI, LEzIONI DIRITTo PR0cESSUAE CIVILE (I926) 148; CORTESIA
DI SEREGO, op. cit. supra note 14, at 2, 49.
16. CHIOVENDA, op. cit. supra note 6, at 65; I CHIOVENDA, SAGa1 Di DIRTTo PRO-
CESSUALE CIvM (1930) 15, 33. Most German writers stress protection of rights, rather
than enforcement of law. Thus HELLWiG, KLAGRFCHT UN] KLAGM6GLICHKEIT (1905)
I. See CoRTnsiA DI SER .o, op. cit. supra note 14, at 32. Some American courts
wrongly suppose that the judicial power cannot properly be invoked unless a wrong has
actually been committed. Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity (1932) 45
HARv. L. REv. 793.
I7. Guggenheim, Vilkerrechtsprozessrecht und inaterielles Recht (1931) I1 ZT. F.
OFF. Rr. 555-576; Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 617 at 64o-3. The "judicial power" is always con-
ceived in constitutional law as a substantive power or prerogative vested in certain
organs of the state, rather than as a process of enforcing certain rules. Cf. also DEGEN-
xo,.p, EINLASSUNGSZWANG UND URTEH.SNORM (1877). The distinction becomes obvious
upon consideration of certain exceptional instances of adjudication: such as the con-
viction of one who is innocent by a court martial, in order to maintain the morale of
troops; or such as the trial of Louis XVI by the Convention, regarding which one
writer says: "The guilt of the king being established by the proofs already mentioned,
was there any tribunal which could try him and sentence him? Was there any law
which applied to his case? In the Convention these questions were debated with splen-
did ability. Robespierre and St. Just carried the majority with them by taking the high
ground that the death of the king was a political necessity. Already condemned by
being deposed, he should be put out of the way in the interest of the public peace and
safety. Under this stern leadership, the Convention became prosecutor, judge, and
jury-creating law as it went forward with the trial." 2 WATSON, THE STORY op
FRAxcE (1899) 788.
IS. Brown and Politis, in (1922) 29 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DRorr INTERNA-
TIONAL 26: "La notion du conflit justiciable est plus large que celle du conflit juridique., Si le fonctionnement de la justice est grandement faciliti par l'existence de nom-
breuses r~gles de droit, il serait inexact d'en conclure que l'oeuvre de la justice est
entrav&e par le d~faut de r~gles de droit, ou que le conflit que ne peut 8tre r~glM par
l'application d'une r~gle de droit est necessairement non justiciable.
'"'exp6rience prouve que, loin d'avoir suivi les codes ou les rdactions de cou-
tumes, les tribunaux les ont prcedes. Elle montre encore que ce qui importe le plus
pour le d~veloppement mime du droit, cest moins sa fixation que l'institution d'un juge."
Cf. LAUTERPACHT, THFE FUNCIlON OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933)
424-5.
19. See DumBAuLD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 174, and authorities there cited.
20. On this topic see Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function ii the Process of
Decision (ig3i) 79 U. op PA. L. REv. 833-868.
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the judicial system with which they were familiar, and an inadequate
idea of law.
To a greater extent than his English or American colleague, the
Continental European magistrate considers himiself as a public official,
a portion of the governmental machinery of the state, instead of as
the authentic expositor of the law, endowed with individuality and
independence as against other organs of administration. 21  The
judiciary is classified by an authoritative French writer as one among
many public services; 22 judges dispense the commodity of justice just
as another public service organization distributes electricity. The dis-
tinction between adjudication and administration tends to become ob-
scured; there are those who declare that there is no essential difference
between judicial and administrative activity.
23
One must not of course overlook the existence of certain adminis-
trative aspects of judicial organization. Before adjudication proper
can begin, a number of physical obstacles to presentation of the case
to the court must be overcome by means of appropriate administrative
arrangements. The litigant's difficulty of getting into court is espe-
cially evident when he invokes an overworked tribunal whose calendar
is crowded, or when he must apply for his remedy to an international
tribunal ad hoc which must be called into being for the particular case.
It has been said, besides, that law is what public officials (i. e.,
judges) do.24  No one will deny that the judge's task is not the same
as that of an attorney or a law professor. He is not there to give
abstract opinions on troublesome points of law. He is a public official,
to whom parties apply only when they want him to do something for
them, to use in their behalf the power which is his.
21. STEED, THE HAPSBURG MONARCHY (2d ed. 1914) 98. (A university professor
is likewise regarded in some Continental countries as primarily a public official rather
than a scientist.) The very instance of dissenting opinions (together with the doctrine
of judicial review) is cited by Kraus, Moden; Developneats of the American, and Ger-
man Judiciary (931), (Harvard Law School Thesis, mimeographed) cap. III, pp. 8 ff.,
as an example indicative of the divergent conceptions of the functions of the judicial
process in the polity of the two nations. Under the Nazi regime, to an extent even
greater than before, the administration of justice in Germany has constituted merely a
portion of the administrative activity of the state as a whole. This is shown particu-
larly by the abrogation in German criminal law of the maxim midlum criine- sine lege.
Only exceptionally, as in war-time, is there a suspicion that American courts regard
themselves as upholders of governmental policy. CHAFER, FREEDo M oF SPEECH (1920)
58, 8o-4, 125-148, 373-4; 3 BEVEmIDGE, THE LiFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919) 42, 46.
Caloyanni, in (1930) 7 REv. INT. DE DRoiT PLNAL 174, says that a judge is not a fonc-
tionnaire.
22. 3 JkZE, Las PRINCIPES GANERAUX DU DRoiT ADMaNISTRATIF (3d ed. 1926)
23-26, treats of the "service public de justice civile".
23. KELSEN, ALLGEmEINE STAATSLEHRE (1925) 242; CORTESIA DI SEREGO, Op. cit.
supra note 14, at 40. Cf. CHIOVENDA, op. cit. vtpra note 6, at 293, 296, 301: 1 CALA-
MANDREI, STUDI SUL PROCESSO CIVILE (1930) 234, 240-1.
24. LLmwELLYN, THE BRAmBLE BUSH (1930) 4.
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Now what judges do is to grant or deny certain specific legal
remedies which have been requested by litigants wishing protection. 25
Whether such relief, shall be granted or not, whether the protective
action sought shall be taken by the court or not, depends on its decision
with respect to a question of law. A judge's action must always corre-
spond to the solution which he has given to the question of law which
he has resolved.20
An administrative authority, however, though it may often have
occasion to determine preliminary questions involving points of law
before it takes action, is not bound to act in accordance with its deter-
mination of those questions. For the administrative official, law is
only the foundation and limitation of his authority; other considera-
tions, not of a legal nature, may properly be taken into account by him
in guiding his action, and indeed are usually the preponderant factors.27
There is therefore justification for the tenacity with which English
and American lawyers have resolutely refused to accept the view which
obliterates the sharp distinction between judges and administrative
officials.
28
Moreover a number of Continental writers are confused because
they tend to think of law as a finite number of precepts. 29 But "a
system of law is not a sort of armoury of rules out of which the judge
merely selects the one that most nearly, fits the facts of the case before
him; no conception of the nature of law and of the judicial function
could be more misleading than that. . . . In any system of law the
function of the judge is not merely to apply a rule to facts, but actually
to formulate a rule which he may apply".
80
Anglo-American law contents itself with the downright declara-
tion that it is of the very essence of the judicial office to ascertain and
determine what the law is.Y- With perhaps keener analytical finesse,
a learned Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice dis-
tinguishes from the "judicial function" of a tribunal its "legislative
25. DUMBAULD, op. cit. sufpra note 5, at 4; Brierly in II BITis H YFAnOOK OF
INT. LAW (1930) 128: ". . law in action always connotes the formulation of a
grievance in the shape of a claim for redress from a court, the formulation of some
specific 'cause of action'. . ."
26. 2 CARNEL TTi, op. cit. m.pra note 15, at 126; 2 DUGUIT, TaAiTf DE DRorr coN-
STITUTIONNEL (2d ed. X922) 322; Permanent Court of International Justice, Ser. A,
No. 24, at io (193o).
27. DIcsINSoN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTIcE AND THE SUPREmACy OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES (927) 24; STEIN, GRuNrDlss DES ZivnPRozEssREc:1s uNI DES KoN-
KURSRECHTS (Juncker ed. 1928) 71.
28. DIcKINSON, op. cit. .ntpra note 27, at 76; Arnold, loc. cit. micpra note 17, at 629.
29. DUMBAULD, op. cit. stpra note 5, at I79, n. 3.
30. Brierly, in 093o) 4 J. RoYAL INST. INT. AEF. 468.
31. Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch 137, at I77 (U. S.
I803) : "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say
what the law is."
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function" of "establishing what the law is on a given point". But in
substance Judge Hammarskjbld does not differ with Chief Justice
Marshall, since he recognizes that the so-called "legislative function" 32
is equally a part of the proper activity of a judicial tribunal.
3
3
The conception just developed with respect to the proper nature
and scope of the judicial function is not out of place in international
law.34  We conclude therefore that the task of a tribunal is to effectuate
the enforcement of law (attuazione del diritto, Rechtsveruirklichung)
in individual cases by ascertaining what the law is with respect to points
in issue, and by acting accordingly in granting or denying the relief
requested.
From this conception of the office of an international tribunal,
what conclusions may be drawn with respect to the desirability of dis-
senting opinions in international adjudication?
So long as international arbitration was nothing more than diplo-
matic negotiation continued by minor dignitaries of the states in con-
flict, subordinate officials who had more leisure than did the framers
of the agreement to arbitrate, 35 the arbitral decision had little value as
evidence of what international law on a given point was. It had served
its purpose when it put an end to the dispute. Consequently, there can
be little if any objection in such cases to the suppression of dissenting
opinions. To publish them would be like publishing in a collection of
statutes the minority reports, proposed drafts and amendments, and
other travauz pr~paratoires of a legislative body.
Where the object of arbitration is simply to arrive at a solution
of a particular dispute which satisfies the parties, without regard to
what international law may prescribe in the premises, there is no occa-
sion to call for publication of dissenting opinions.
3 6
But where, on the other hand, arbitral or .judicial procedure aims
to reach a solution based upon the ascertainment of what international
law ordains, (i. e., includes "elaboration" of law), and where, in con-
sequence, the decision rendered is of possible importance or value as
32. In the interest of simplicity of nomenclature, it would seem better to say that
the judicial function (i. e., the function of a court) includes both application and "elab-
oration" of law. For the latter term see Dickinson, Legal Rides: Their Application
and Elaboration (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. io52.
33. Hammarskj6ld, in (193o) 9 J. ROYAL INST. INr. AF. 468.
34. See DUMBAULD, op. cit. mtpra note 5, at 17, n. 4. ANZILOrI, CoRso DI DmTTo
INTERNAZIONALE (3d ed. 1928) accepts the view of Chiovenda (see note I6 supra) as
to the function of procedural law for the international community. However, MORELLI,
LA SENTENZA INTERNAZIONALE (1931) 208-9, rejects the maintenance of law or rights
as the function of international jurisdiction. He lays stress on the solution of contro-
versies, whether in accordance with law or otherwise.
35. VAN VOLLENHOVEN, DE JuRE PACdS (1932) 41.
36. Thus a conciliation commission need only state its recommendations, with rea-
sons to substantiate them and show their desirability. A review of the arguments
antagonistic to its conclusions is superfluous.
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authority in subsequent cases involving the same point, it then becomes
desirable that dissenting opinions be made known.
3 7
Thug it is very natural that we find dissenting opinions in English
and American law, where the doctrine of stare decisis is in force. But
our conclusion holds wherever judicial decisions have any value what-
ever as precedents; they need not be absolutely binding, as in the Anglo-
American system. That in international law great weight is attributed
to previous adjudications, although there is no rule of stare decisis
applicable, is indisputable.38  That the pronouncements of international
tribunals are highly esteemed as evidence of what the law is needs no
demonstration. Our observations apply with peculiar force in the
case of a tribunal like the Permanent Court of International Justice,
which is designed to build up a settled body of jurisprudence by its
activity over a period of years, and thus contribute to the development
of international law.3 9
Satisfaction to the parties as the objective of arbitration, (a
hypothesis compatible with the suppression of dissenting opinions),
must be distinguished from satisfaction to the parties as the test of
justiciability, a doctrine which does not weaken the conclusions just
stated as to the desirability of dissenting opinions in cases where a
solution according to law is sought.
According to the classification of controversies just mentioned, a
dispute is justiciable when a decision according to law would dispose
of it in a satisfactory manner. Of course a dispute is technically
"justiciable" the moment that a judicial tribunal has jurisdiction to
decide it.40 States may agree to settle any sort of dispute in any way,
hence, by judicial decision. 41  A legal dispute is one in which both
parties are seeking a solution according to a system of law conceived
as existing.42 Such a decision of any dispute according to a given
system of law is always possible, since the plaintiff's application for
relief will be either granted or rejected.43  But the settlement arrived
37. Theoretically there is no necessary connection between the legitimacy of "elab-
oration" of law by the court, and the effect of judicial decisions as precedent. But both
would be forbidden by a strict adherence to the Continental theory which regards ad-
judication as the administrative application of a closed corpus of rules, and in practice
a court having the power to elaborate law is likely to regard judicial decisions as excel-
lent evidence of what the law is, even if they are not binding authority. Cf. articles
38 (4) and 59 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
38. See Hall, The Force of Precedents in International Law (1916) 26 INT. J.
ETHICS 149-167; and Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law (1934) 50
L. Q. REV. 4o-65, especially at 64.
39. See, e. g., Hammarskj6ld, loc. cit. supra note 33, at 492.
40. SCOTT, SOVEREIGN STATES AND SUITS (1925) 147.
41. Williams, Justiciable and Other Disputes (1932) 26 Am. J. INT. LAW 31, 34.
42. Id. at 36.
43. As to gaps in the law, see DUmBAULD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 179, n. 3; VEn-
DROSS, op. cit. stipra note 9, at § 19; Soz&I.6, JuRISTISCHE GRuNDLEHRE (1917) 397 ff.;
LAUTERPACnT, op. cit. supra note 18, at 6o ff.
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at by that mechanical process may not be so satisfactory as an adjust-
ment reached by legislative or other methods. 44 A dispute is therefore
politically justiciable when the solution reached by a judicial tribunal
on the basis of existing law will give satisfaction to the parties and be
accepted by them as putting an end to the dispute.45
It is thus apparent that the effect of the doctrine is merely to
classify disputes by distinguishing those which may properly be re-
ferred to a judicial tribunal from those for which some other method
of settlement shotild be sought. But with respect to those disputes
which are thus determined to be susceptible of satisfactory solution
according to law, the conclusions reached above as to dissenting opin-
ions hold good. In the contingency in question, the parties do not seek
for their dispute a solution which is satisfactory (whether or not ac-
cording to law), but they declare that a solution according to law will
be satisfactory. Consequently in such disputes dissenting opinions are
desirable.
A similar analysis remains to be made if one accepts the doctrine
regarding the nature of arbitration 46 according to which international
disputes caii only be settled by an agreement of the parties. The terms
or content of this accord, however, may be "integrated by a third
party", i. e., fixed by the decision of the tribunal. If one adopts this
theory, it remains to ascertain in the particular case whether the arbi-
trator is free to make his award arbitrarily, or must decide in accord-
ance with the applicable rules of international law.47 In the latter
alternative, we are again confronted with the situation in which we
have found dissenting opinions to be desirable.
We have said that when the function of an adjudicating agency
is not merely to dispose of an individual dispute in any manner which
will satisfy the parties, but to render an award in conformity with
what it finds to be the law of the case, then dissenting opinions should
be made known in order that the effect of the decision as a precedent
affecting the settlement of other cases may be correctly judged and
evaluated.
44. Roden, in (,93i) 58 R. D. I. L. C. 770.
45. Brierly, in (1925) 4 J. RoykL INST. INT. AFF. 234: "A dispute is justiciable
when a community recognizes the decision of it according to law as really putting an
end to it, and when such a mode of decision is normally acquiesced in, whether willingly
or reluctantly, by the disputing parties. But these conditions are satisfied only so long
as each party claims, or can be forced to content himself with, his rights according to
law; they cease to be satisfied when the claim of one is for some advantage over the
other, regardless of whether it may be his legal right or not"
46. Advanced by 3 ANZrLoTTI, CORSO DI Dn tino INTERNAZIONALLE (915) 40ff.,
but now abandoned by him. See note 34 mspr, and Morelli in (I932) ii Riv. Di DiR.
INT. 457-6o.
47. See 3 ANzuorrr, CoRso Di DnuTTo INTERNAZIONALE (1915) 98; i id. (3d ed.
I928) at 276-7.
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In Anglo-American law where the doctrine of stare decisis attaches
binding force to precedents, lawyers find dissenting opinions very help-
ful in determining whether a particular adjudication represents a well
settled principle of law, or is of limited and weaker authority. In
judging whether a decision is a procreative and desirable precedent to
be extended by analogy, or one to be confined narrowly to its own
facts, it is often quite useful to know whether it had the approval of a
unanimous court, or was pronounced by a small majority against the
dissent of the ablest and most learned judges. Again, on the other
hand, the fact of dissent may show that the court's conclusion repre-
sents a settled conviction, having been reached in spite of the opposing
considerations which it has had occasion to weigh carefully.48
We know that the law is a living thing. We can better gauge the
direction and strength of the forces which guide its growth if we know
the full and complete state of the authorities, the exact complexion of
the judicial conviction.
If these arguments for dissenting opinions hold with respect to a
system of law where it would be thinkable to treat all judicial pro-
nouncements, irrespective of their rational foundation, as equally en-
dowed with binding force by the rule of stare deciss, they apply
a fortiori in international law where the authority of a decision depends
solely upon its intrinsic value and the justness of the reasoning upon
which it is based.
An excellent exposition of the reasons justifying dissenting opin-
ions may be found in the minutes of the Committee of Jurists which
Met in Geneva, March ii-i9, 1929, to study the Statute of the Per-
manent Court of International Justice with a view to its amendment.
On that occasion a proposal to prohibit dissehting opinions, presented
by Judge Fromageot, was discussed and defeated.
M. Politis, who when the Statute was originally adopted had
accepted dissenting opinions simply out of a spirit of conciliation, and
not from conviction, had become convinced of their utility by the
Court's experience in practice. He pointed out to the Committee that
the function of the Court was not merely to decide individual disputes,
but also to build up a body of jurisprudence by its decisions, which
varied in value according as they had been rendered unanimously or
not.49
Another argument advanced by M. Politis was the fact that the
publication of dissenting opinions was a sort of "safety-valve" afford-
48. WA=BAUGiE, THE STUDY OF CASES (2d ed. 1894) 49; LLEWELLYN, PRXJUDI-
ZIENF-CHT UND REHTSPRECPHUNG iN AmMUIKA (933) 58.
49. League of Nations Document, C. 166. M. i66. (1929) V, 51. (See also Anzi-
lotti, in P. C. I. J., Ser. D, No. 2 (Addendum, 1926) 202.)
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ing an outlet for the sentiments of the losing party.50 A defeated
litigant might find consolation in the fact that its views had impressed
a minority of the court and had received able statement in a dissenting
opinion. States would have the assurance that their arguments had not
been slighted by the Court, but in the face of weightier opposing con-
tentions had been deemed insufficient to prevail.
Not only is there this psychological advantage, but the possibility
for a judge who is not satisfied with the Court's treatment of a case
to express his own dissenting opinion has the effect of ensuring that
careful attention will be given by the Court to all aspects of the case
before pronouncing its decision. Thus a guarantee is afforded against
the subconscious intrusion of political considerations.5 1
Dissenting opinions are indispensable in order to avoid misleading
the public.52  Without the possibility for a dissenting judge to indicate
his true views, the public might be led to suppose that a particular
decision represented the unanimous judgment of the Court, when in
fact such was not the case at all.5 3  Or on the other hand, more
sophisticated observers, who knew that disseiting opinions were pro-
hibited, would question the value of every pronouncement of the Court,
suspecting it to have been voted by a small majority, perhaps by the
preponderant voice of the President in case of a tie. In either event,
the prestige and authority of the Court would suffer accordingly. To
mislead students of international law and the general public by such a
suggestio falsi ac suppressio veri would not only make for scientific
inexactitude but would smack as well of political dishonesty. Such a
policy would be incompatible with the modern tendency towards greater
publicity 54 and open diplomacy. Certainly if a tribunal such as the
Permanent Court of International Justice, where dissenting opinions
had already established themselves, were to modify its practice, public
50. Cf. the remarks of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Morgan, 313
U. S. 409, 421 (1941) : "In publicly criticizing this Court's opinion the Secretary merely
indulged in a practice familiar in the long history of Anglo-American litigation,;
whereby unsuccessful litigants and lawyers give vent to their disappointment in tavern
or press."
51. The learned Swiss jurist, Max Huber, former President of the Court, brought
this point to the attention of the Committee. League of Nations Document, C. i66. M.
i66. (1929) V, 52. LLEwELLYx, op. cit. supra note 48, at 58, points out that the possi-
bility of criticism is a guarantee that judges will act conscientiously and diligently. (In
the course of his. discussion of the subject (id. at 52-61), Llewellyn also reviews vari-
ous other aspects of the scientific, legal, political and social value of dissenting opin-
ions.)
52. Judges Moore, Anzilotti and Huber emphasize the importance of not allowing
the public to obtain an impression not in accordance with the facts. P. C. I. J., Ser.
D, No. 2 (Addendum, i926) 201, 223.
53. One must also reckon with the likelihood that a judge desirous of disclaiming
responsibility for a decision taken against his will might make a private disclosure of
his opinion which would be injurious to the prestige of the Court. Elilhu Root, loc. cit.
supra note 49.
54. One might also invoke a policy in favor of the spread of science by providing
the best possible documentation relating to international affairs.
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opinion, especially in America, could not fail to be unfavorably im-
pressed. 5r
Against these convincing arguments only two reasons 5G are ad-
vanced in favor of prohibiting dissenting opinions: (i) fear lest the
prestige and authority of the Court may be weakened if it is known
that able jurists on the Court hold a view at variance with that given
out as the official opinion of the Court; 57 (2) fear lest the absence of
secrecy endanger the independence of the judges, especially the national
judges ad hoc selected to sit in a particular case. 58
That the authority and prestige of the Court would be weakened
to a much greater extent if it were not possible for dissenting judges
to express their views is amply clear after what has been said above.
Without that possibility, there would not be present the "safety-valve"
and guarantee of painstaking deliberation unaffected by subconscious
intrusion of political considerations. Lawyers would have less faith
in the jurisprudence built up by the Court, for no utterance emanating
from it could be accepted as evidence of anything more than the opinion
of a bare majority of the judges, made up perhaps of the weakest and
least capable members of the Court, arrived at possibly by the Presi-
dent's casting vote. Public opinion would be suspicious of decisions
"huddled up in conclave" without opportunity for criticism,59 just as
it is skeptical regarding news dispatches from states with censorship
curbing freedom of the press.
Moreover the publication of dissenting opinions does not really
weaken the authority of the Court. Parties to the dispute are bound
by the judgment as res judicata just as much whether there are dis-
senting opinions or not. And if an advisory opinion to clear up doubt-
ful points of law is sought, rather than a binding judgment, it must
be admitted that a truer picture of the state of the law is furnished by
the Court's opinion when accompanied by dissenting opinions than
when the latter are omitted. The absence of unanimity among the able
55. Root, loc. cit. supra note 49; Huber, P. C. I. J., loc. cit. mtpra note 52, at i9s.
56. One may neglect Judge Loder's argument that the framers of the Statute in-
tended to create a court of Continental pattern, an organism enouncing a corporate
utterance of opinion. That supposition has not been substantiated by the actual trend
of the Court's development. Moreover, dissenting opinions in no wise detract from the
Court's corporate pronouncement; they merely add something else, the individual views
of the dissenting judges. P. C. I. J., loc. cit. smpra note 52, at i95.
57. Documents concerning the action taken by the Council of the League of Na-
tions under article 14 of the Covenant and the adoption by the Assembly of the Statute
of the Permanent Court (i92i) 135, 138.
58. Fromageot, loc. cit. supra note 49, at 50; Weiss, P. C. I. J., loc. cit. mpra note
52, at 2o4. See also note 7o infra as to national judges.
59. Abandonment of the practice of seriatim opinions in favor of delivery of the
court's opinion by one justice, even when the others were free to dissent if they wished,
did not escape animadversion in America. 3 BEvE=maG, THE Luna oF JoHx MARsHALL
(I919) i6. "An opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, deliv-
ered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a
crafty chief judge. . . ." 4 id. at 339.
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jurists composing the Court should be taken as indicative of the com-
plexity and doubtfulness of the legal questions involved in the case, and
not as warranting any lack of respect for the tribunal deciding them.
The second objection to dissenting opinions is likewise vulnerable.\
It should be noted at the outset that the independence of judges is
greatest in English and American law, where dissenting opinions are
the rule, and that national judges ad hoc always constitute a negligible
minority of the entire Court. Even if governments tend to regard
national judges as representatives of their own point of view, and
would seek to visit displeasure upon a judge voting against his country's
contentions, the situation would hardly be bettered by secrecy. A
malicious foreign office would surely be able to find out anyhow that
its judge had voted against it; the fact that his attitude was not made
known publicly would merely make it more difficult for an upright
magistrate to defend himself against the intrusion of politics when
standing for re-election. His known honesty and ability, manifested
in his published opinions, together with a high standard of public
opinion, enlightened in its requirements of governments, constitute a
better assurance of a judge's independence than secrecy in voting.
It might be possible however to obtain most of the advantages of
dissenting opinions by publishing them without indicating the names of
their authors. An analogous practice prevails in the deliberations of
the Permanent Court of International Justice. When public hearings
in a case are concluded, before consultation, each judge prepares a
preliminary statement of his opinion, and these memoranda are circu-
lated anonymously among the other members of the Court.
II
Passing from our discussion of dissenting opinions -on principle
to a historical examination of international practice,60 we notice that
the right of an arbitrator to indicate his dissatisfaction with the award
rendered was recognized by a very old usage. 1 Thus the American
arbitrator E. H. Kellogg stated briefly the reasons for his dissent when
the award of the Halifax commission was rendered on November :23,
1877.62
In the Alabama arbitration, on September 14, 1874, at the time
of rendering the award, the dissenting English arbitrator, Sir Alex-
ander Cockburn, did not sign it but he handed in a bulky paper which
6o. On this subeject consult the doctrinal note in 2 LAPRADELLE Er PoLITis, REcuEiI
DES AR BITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX (1923) 922.
6I. Martens, in 2 DEuxIkmE CONFtRENCE INTERNATIONALE DE LA PAIX, AcrEs ET
DOCUMENTS (907) 361.
62. I Moo E, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH
THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY (1898) 745, 746.
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he desired to be attached to the protocol. Count Sclopis, president of
the tribunal, said that this would be done. The paper was not however
annexed to the copy given to the United States, but was printed in the
London Gazette, a copy of which was furnished to the United States
agent. Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, said that the agent would have
felt it his right and duty to object to the reception and filing of such a
document, had he been acquainted with its contents.6 3 The unfavorable
impression caused by Sir Alexander Cockburn's opinion seems to have
been due to the temper and tone of his language 6 4 rather than to any
antagonism to dissenting opinions as such.
The Hague Convention of 1899 in article 52 permitted a state-
ment of dissent, but without reasons. That article required that an
award must be signed by every member of the tribunal,6 5 and it was
felt that an arbitrator thus compelled .to affix his signature to an
instrument of whose terms he disapproved should be allowed to ex-
onerate himself of responsibility by indicating his dissent at the time of
signing.66
The Dutch delegate Loeff proposed to the second Peace Confer-
ence in 1907 that article 52 be changed by doing away with the right
to express dissent.6 7 Lammasch, the famous Austrian jurist, suggested
that the signature of the President and of the Secretary of the tribunal
should be prescribed as sufficient to authenticate the award. Thus it
would no longer be necessary for all members of the tribunal to sign,
and their right to state their dissent could be done away with.68 These
proposals were adopted.
The Committee of Jurists which framed the Statute of the Per-
manent Court of International Justice proposed to revive the 1899 rule
permitting a judge to record his dissent, but without giving his rea-
sons.6 9 Professor de Lapradelle had been insistent that a national
judge ad hoc, if he could give a dissenting opinion, would always do
63. Id. at 652, 659.
64. Sir Aleaqg' eflections upon the arguments of the United States and the
method of conducting the arbitration were resented.
65. To the same effect article 23 of the Institut rules of 1873, with the proviso that
if a minority refused to sign, signature by the majority with a statement of such refusal
was sufficient. L'INSTrT DE DROIT INTEmNATIONAL, Procidure Arbitrale, Article 23.
66. Pursuant to this provision, the Japanese arbitrator, Motono, dissented in the
House Tax case, decided on May 22, 1905. After article 52 was suppressed in 19o7,
Drago rendered a dissenting opinion in the North Atlantic Fisheries case in accord-
ance with article 9, clause 2 of the compromi,s of September 7, I91o. WMsoX, THE
HAGuE ARBITATiooN CASES (I915) 61-2, I92ff. Other arbitration agreements have
also provided for dissenting opinions. A number of valuable opinions have been given
by the American arbitrator, Nielsen.
67. 2 Martens, loc.. cit. supra note 6I, at 360.
68. Id. at 732; LAMMAScHr, DIE LEHRE vON DER SCnIEDSGERICHTSBAxET IN
IHREM GANZEN UMFANGE (914) 170.
69. Permanent Court of International justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists,
Proc6s-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee June 16-July 24, 192o, with an-
nexes, 591-2.
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so; 70 and it would be unfair if a discrimination were made and such a
right given only to the other members of the Court.71
The Council of the League of Nations, however, in its meeting at
Brussels adopted a number of amendments drafted by Sir Cecil Hurst,
Commendatore Anzilotti and Professor van Hamel, including the
present text of article 57 of the Statute.72  This text was approved
by the Assembly, after a discussion in the subcommittee of the third
committee where Sir Cecil Hurst strongly urged its advantages.7
In the Rules of Court of March 24, 1922, provision was made in
rule 62 (prescribing what the judgment must contain) for attaching
to the judgment the opinions of dissenting judges, at their request.7 4
Upon the proposal of Judge Beichmann, similar language was included
in rule 71 with respect to advisory opinions.75
The Committee of Jurists had proposed to permit statement of
disserit, but without reasons. The Statute authorizes dissenting opin-
ions, but is silent with respect to the legitimacy of a mere statement of
dissent without giving any reasons. The Court's practice however
soon established that a simple statement of dissent was allowable, the
greater including the less.
Accordingly, amendments to rules 62 and 71 codifying that prac-
tice were adopted, in consequence of a proposal made by the Registrar,
when the Rules were amended as of July 31, 1926. These provisions
were incorporated, without modification, in rules 74 and 84 when the
Rules were revised as of March II, 1936.76
70. Id. at 531; cf. Hill, National iudges in the Permanent Court of Intenlationod
Justice (1931) 25 Am. J. INT. L. 670, 68i-z.
71. Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists,
Proc s-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee June i6-July 24, i92o, with, an-
nexes, 743.
72. "If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion
of the judges, dissenting judges are entitled to deliver a separate opinion." Loc. cit.
supra note 57, at 42.
73. Politis favored it; Fromageot and Loder were against it. Fernandez, recalling
that in the Committee of Jurists he had favored publication of dissenting opinions, said
that the new provision was certainly better than that proposed by the Committee of
Jurists (which permitted statement of dissent but without giving reasons), although an
argument might be made for altogether suppressing any indication of lack of unanim-
ity. Id. at 138.
74. See P. C. I. J., Ser. D, No. 2, at 55i (1922). "The opinions of judges who
dissent from the judgment shall be attached thereto should they express a desire to
that effect." Article 51 of the draft rules proposed by the League Secretariat had
read: "The judgment shall contain . . . (9) dissenting opinions." Id. at 266, 267.
75. Id. at 219. "The opinions of dissenting judges may, at their request, be at-
tached to the opinion of the Court." See also id. at 575-576.
76. P. C. I. J., loc. cit. mtpra note 52, at 171, 172, 313, 315. The language of rule
62 (incorporated in rule 74 by the 1936 revision) follows: "The judgment shall con-
tain: . . . The number of the judges constituting the majority.
"2. Dissenting judges may, if they so desire, attach to the judgment either an ex-
position of their individual opinion or a statement of their dissent" (3d Addendum,
1936, rule 74, P. 1020.)
Rule 71 (which in 1936 became rule 84) reads: "Advisory opinions . . . shall
mention the number of judges constituting the majority.
"Dissenting judges may, if they so desire, attach to the opinion of the Court either.
an exposition of their individual opinion or the statement of their dissent." (3d Adden-
dum, 1936, rule 84, p. 1023.)
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The practice of the Court likewise sanctions dissenting opinions in
connection with orders, 7 and also separate concurring opinions, 8 but
no corresponding modification of the texts governing the Court's
activity has been made.
A practice also grew up in good faith whereby certain judges did
not dissent publicly, but filed secret dissenting opinions with the minutes
of the Court's deliberations. 9  When Lord Finlay became a member
of the Court, he found this practice particularly undesirable, and a stop
was put to it by a resolution of the Court.80 This resolution was
adopted during the discussion of dissenting opinions which led to ac-
ceptance of the above-mentioned amendments to the Rules proposed by
the Registrar.
Upon the same occasion the Court took action with respect to a
proposal which had been made by judges Loder and Weiss. They
desired to eliminate the provision in rule 71 authorizing dissent in con-
nection -with advisory opinions. While recognizing that the right
recognized in rule 62 to dissent in contentious cases was given by
article 57 of the Statute and was not within the control of the Court,
they nevertheless contended that the Court could and should abolish
the similar right conferred by rule 71, an innovation undertaken upon
the Court's own initiative and perhaps even violative of article 54 of
the Statute which enjoins secrecy of the Court's deliberations.81
Judge Anzilotti contended that article 57 laid down a fundamental
principle which should be extended to advisory procedure by analogy,
like article 31 with respect to national judges ad hoc. s2  Conflicting
views were expressed by several other members of the Court as to
,whether the reasons militating in favor of dissenting opinions in con-
tentious cases applied a fortiori in advisory cases or had less force.8 3
77. P. C. I. J., Ser. C, No. 53, at 199 (r93i). For an example see P. C. I. J., Ser.
A/B, No. 58 (933). It is recognized that this practice has no basis in the language
of the Statute, and is a matter over which the Court itself has full control. P. C. I. J.,Ser. D, No. 2, at 24-25 (3d Addendum, 1936).
78. Loc. cit. supra note 49, at 66. Judge Anzilotti's opinion in the Customs Union
case, is an example. P. C. I. J., Ser. A/B, No. 4X (931). This practice seems clearly
warranted by a proper interpretation of the language of the Statute (quoted in note 72
supra).
79. P. C. I. J., loc. cit. supra note 52, at 209, 2o.
So. Id. at 222.
8r. Id. at 283, 195. Cf. the observations of Judge Moore. Id. at 200, 201.
82. Id. at 196.
83. Judge de Bustamante contended that in advisory proceedings all opinions should
be expressed, since the parties sought a guide for their conduct and not a decision which
they must accept. Id. at i95. Judges Weiss and Nyholm thought that an opinion ac-
companied by contradictory views would be of little value in contributing toward clari-
fication of the situation. Id. at 196, 197, i98. Reference was made to the practice of
the British privy council when giving advice to the crown, where no variant opinions
are expressed. Id. at 195. But there a body of advisers are counselling the govern-
ment as to the course of policy it should pursue. The advisory opinions of the Court,
however, are really a means of obtaining, without resort to obligatory arbitration, "a
legal decision arrived at according to judicial procedure". Hammarskj6ld, loc. cit.
supra note 33, at 487.
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The Loder-Weiss amendment was defeated,8 4 and a proposal in
the opposite sense made by Judges Moore, Finlay and Anzilotti was
taken up. This proposal contemplated amending rules 62 and 71 so as
to provide that the names of all dissenting judges, as well as any
opinions they might write, should be published in the judgment or
opinion of the Court. 5
Against this amendment, however, it was shown that the Statute
in article 57 gave to a judge who disagreed with the majority only a
right, and not a duty, to make known his dissent. But although the
name. of a@ particular dissenting judge could not be published without
his consent, it would be possible and desirable to state in the Court's
decision the number of judges making up the majority by which it had
been adopted. 6
This was important because some judges,87 when they disagreed
with the majority, out of respect for the Court never published a dis-
senting opinion; whereas others regularly did. The absence of a dis-
senting opinion, therefore, did not necessarily mean that the Court was
unanimous; and the public might be misled.88 A suggestion of Judge
de Bustamante 89 (that the judgment always state whether it was
unanimous or not) having been criticized by Judge Anzilotti as in-
sufficient,90 a more explicit proposal made by Judge Moore 91 was
adopted.92 Rules 62 and 71 were accordingly amended so as to provide
that the judgment or opinion must state the number of judges forming
the majority by which it has been adopted. 93
Subsequently, in the Committee of Jurists studying the Statute
with a view to its amendment, judge Fromageot revived the Loder-
Weiss proposal of suppressing dissenting opinions, but his suggestion
met with disfavor.9 4
judge Hurst, on the other hand, renewed the Finlay-Moore-
Anzilotti proposal. Sir Cecil wished to go even further and provide
that every judge who dissents must do so in a motivated opinion, giving
reasongYl' He pointed out as undesirable the possibility exemplified
84. P. C. I. J., loc. cit. supra note 52, at 198.
85. Id. at 272.
86. Id. at 20i, 210, 211. (Anzilotti and Huber.)
87. Like Loder and Weiss. Id. at 212.
88. Id. at 201, 223. (Anzilotti and Huber.)
89. Id. at 218.
go. Since one judge, without even giving reasons, could produce a situation appear-
ing identical with that where a judgment had been adopted by the casting vote of the
president ito case of a tie. Id. at 222.
9i. Id. at 220.
92. Id. at 223.
93. For the text of these provisions, which in 1936 were incorporated in rules 74
and 84, see note 76 supra.
94. Loc. ct. mpra note 49, at 50.
95. "Par une piece motivee." P. C. I. J., Ser. D, No. 2, at 294 (2d Addendum,
1926). Judge Hurst restated during the deliberations regarding revision of the rules
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in the case relating to the Free City of Danzig and the International
Labor Organization,90 where the majority was 7 to 4, but 2 of the 4
judges voting against the majority did not publicly state their dissent,
and thus remained anonymous.
However, the Hurst proposal fared no better than the earlier
attempt to publish the names of dissenting judges. The Statute does
not oblige a judge who differs with the majority either to state his
dissent publicly, or a fortiori to write an opinion giving the grounds
of his view. Would it be wise for the Court, even if it has the power
to do so, to go beyond the provisions of the Statute in this respect?
III
An analysis of the contents of the dissenting opinions which have
been handed down by members of international tribunals would lead
us too far afield into many branches of substantive law. Suffice it to
say that the judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice
have very frequently had occasion to set forth their individual Views.
9 7
Dissenting opinions appear to have become a well established ifeature
of the judicial process in international practice.
in 1936 his belief that a judge dissenting from the decision of the Court chould give
his reasons for doing so. Id., Ser. D, No. 3, at 671 (3d Addendum, 1936). Judge
Anzilotti also renewed his opposition to the practice of permitting a statement of dis-
sent without reasons. The Registrar reminded the Court that at the time the rules
were previously amended, it had been deemed important to prevent misleading the pub-
lic with regard to the composition of the majority by which the Court's decision had
been reached. For that reason it had been concluded to make public the number of
judges voting for and against the decision; and also to encourage dissenting judges to
disclose how they had voted by giving them an opportunity to state publicly their dis-
sent. Id. at 325.
96. P. C. I. J., Ser. D, No. 2, at 294 (2d Addendum, ;926). But see 'P. x. I. J.,
Ser. B, No. 18, at 16 (ig3o), where the decision is indicated as 6-4.
97. Tabulation of 169 instances up to January i, 194o, in which judges have ex-
pressed their dissatisfaction with the majority opinion would seem to indicate that the
personality of judges, rather than their ad hoc or permanent tenure, governs the fre-
quency of their dissent. Thus Judges Schficking and Rostworowski, after becoming
permanent judges, continued to be frequent dissenters. A similar conclusion is -reached
by Hill, loc. cit. supra note 70, at 682, 683.
The list of dissents follows: Anzilotti, 18; Altamira, 16; Rostworowski, -15; van
Eysinga, 13; Hurst, Negulesco, Schficking, 9; Nyholm, 8; de Bustamante, Hudson, 6;
Finlay, Rolin-Jacquemyns, 5; Fromageot, Huber, Pessoa, Urrutia, 4; Moore, Nagaoka,
R6mer'is, de Visscher, Wang, Weiss, 3; Dreyfus, Ehrlich, Erich, Guerrero, Kellogg,
Loder, Papazoff, Sf&iades, 2; Caloyanni, Cheng, Hammarskj6ld, Hermann-Otavsk ,
Novacovitch, Oda, Rabel, de TomcsAny, Vogt, i. Of these, as national judges:
R6mer'is, 3; Dreyfus, Ehrlich, Papazoff, Rostworowski, Schficking, S~ffriades, 2;
Caloyanni, Hermann-Otavskk, Novacovitch, Rabel, de TomcsAny, Vogt, i.
